Mobility Global MBGL
-3.8%vs Day 1Spinoff of S&P Global (SPGI) · Classic Spinoff · Spun Jul 1, 2026
Current Stats
Post-Spinoff Performance
| Spinoff date | July 1, 2026 · NYSE |
| Days since spinoff | 40 days |
| Day 1 price (close) | $21.19 |
| Post-spin low | $19.26 on Jul 6, 2026 · 5 days post-spin |
| Current price (Jul 31, 2026) | $20.38 |
| Return vs Day 1 | -3.8% |
| Return vs post-spin low | +5.8% |
| Parent since spinoff | -0.7% |
Price History
yfinance (raw OHLC + adjusted close + volume + splits). As of Aug 10, 2026.
⚠️ Correction (July 31, 2026) — read before the analysis below
Every section of this page written before July 31, 2026 describes Mobility Global as having “≈60% EBITDA margins” on “$1.6B of revenue.” Both figures are wrong, and the valuation work built on them is therefore wrong. The company’s Investor Day financials (June 1, 2026 deck, slides 11 / 94 / 108–111) show FY2025 revenue of $1,750M and adjusted EBITDA of $711M — a 40.6% margin, not ≈60%. The ≈$1.6B revenue figure was FY2024’s $1,613M. The gap between a 40.6% EBITDA margin and a 12.6% net margin is $310M of D&A, largely amortization of intangibles from the legacy IHS Markit merger.
($M) FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 Total revenue 1,485 1,613 1,750 GAAP EBITDA 546 608 649 (37.1% margin) Adjusted EBITDA 598 658 711 — 40.6% margin Free cash flow 375 412 461 (26.3% margin) GAAP net income — — 220 Consequences: the grade was downgraded A+ (4.60) → A (4.35) on the data correction — not on any business deterioration — and the implied-valuation ladder in Financials & Valuation below (18x/22x/28x on a $960M EBITDA estimate → $17B/$21B/$27B EV) is void. Actual enterprise value at the July 31 close is ≈$7.81B, or 11.0x EV/adjusted EBITDA. The recommendation remains BUY.
Corrections on this site are additive: the prose below is left exactly as published, because it is the record of what each report said at the time. Read it with this correction in hand. The restated analysis is in Analysis — July 31, 2026 at the foot of this page and in the July 31, 2026 report.
Post Spin Analysis
Written August 5, 2026, against prices as of the July 31, 2026 close. This is a point-in-time assessment and is not updated as the price moves — see Current Stats above for the latest figures.
What happened
Mobility Global separated from S&P Global on July 1, 2026 in the cleanest structure this site tracks: a 1-for-1 distribution, 100% distributed with S&P Global retaining nothing, 294,821,318 shares, NYSE-listed. No retained stake means no overhang on either side, and the price action showed it — a shallow, fast dip to $19.26 on day 5, then a grind back to $20.38 by month-end. That is -3.8% against the $21.19 Day-1 close and +5.8% off the low.
For a separation this large, that is an unremarkable debut — which is itself the point. The forced-selling trough the framework predicts arrived early and was mild. Parent SPGI is -0.7% over the same window; neither side was punished.
The number that changed the thesis
The substantive event of this month was not the price. It was the discovery that the margin figure this profile had carried since October 2025 was wrong — “≈60% EBITDA margins” against an actual 40.6%. The full restatement is in the correction notice at the top of this page.
What matters for the forward view is that the error ran in one direction and touched everything downstream. The valuation ladder, the peer comparison against Verisk, the acquisition price range and the bull case were all built on a margin the company does not earn. The grade fell A+ (4.60) → A (4.35) as a result — a data correction, not a business deterioration.
The business is unchanged. CARFAX is still a near-monopoly with 40 years of irreplaceable data, 53M+ car-care users, 40,000+ dealer customers and 100% of the top-40 OEMs. Revenue grew 8.5% in FY2025. What changed is the price we think it deserves, and the honest answer is a good business at a reasonable multiple rather than a great business at an extraordinary discount.
What the market is actually paying
At $20.38 the market cap is $6.01B; with ≈$1.8B of net debt that is an enterprise value of ≈$7.81B, or 11.0x adjusted EBITDA, 13.0x free cash flow and a 7.7% FCF yield.
Two things follow. First, the stock trades below the 18x “conservative” floor the pre-spin ladder assumed, on an EBITDA base a quarter smaller than that ladder used — the mispricing the A+ implied simply is not there, but neither is the stock expensive. Second, the capital-return story is more interesting than the valuation. Management has committed to returning 75%+ of free cash flow, of which roughly six-sevenths is repurchases; the headline dividend will yield only 0.6-0.9% because it is set against a GAAP net income that $310M of intangible amortization suppresses. Total shareholder yield is 6.2-6.3%.
Discounting total distributions rather than dividends alone implies $24-42 per share. The current quote sits below every cell in that grid.
The one thing to underwrite
The balance sheet starts offside its own target. ≈$2B of notes — raised to fund a ≈$1.9B payment to S&P Global on the way out the door — is 2.81x gross leverage against a stated <2.5x ceiling. It self-cures at the guided growth rate (2.57x in 2026, 2.35x in 2027) without repaying a dollar, and having committed 75%+ of FCF to shareholders, management has structurally chosen to grow into the target rather than pay down principal.
That is the right call while the shares trade at a 7.7% FCF yield against a ≈4.1% after-tax cost of debt — buying stock earns more than retiring debt. It is worth naming plainly all the same: this is a SpinCo that was levered up to write its parent a cheque, and the leverage math only works if the growth shows up.
What to watch
First standalone results land August 7, 2026 — before market open, with a call at 8:00am ET. That print replaces the estimates this analysis rests on with actuals: real standalone margins, the actual interest expense on the new notes, the stand-up cost run-rate, and possibly the first dividend declaration. Everything above should be re-read against it.
Beyond that: whether the buyback actually begins in 2027 as guided, and whether the acquisition interest the pre-spin analysis assumed materialises now that a public price exists. At ≈$7.81B, a takeout is a far smaller cheque than the $18-28B the earlier work imagined.
All analysis below is pre-spinoff
Written before Mobility Global began trading July 1, 2026. Kept as published — figures, valuations and grades reflect what was known at the time, not today.
Executive Summary
Management Team
| Role | Name | Background |
|---|---|---|
| CEO | Bill Eager | President of S&P Global Mobility; led division through separation planning |
| CFO-designate | Matt Calderone | Named March 2026; prior role undisclosed |
| Chief Accounting Officer | Renato Negro | Effective April 6, 2026; reports to CFO-designate |
| President, CARFAX | Scott Fredericks | Promoted from COO of CARFAX |
| President, Business Solutions | Joe Lafeir | Former President of Automotive Insights |
| Chief Legal Officer | Tasha Matharu | Deputy General Counsel of S&P Global |
| Chief Information Officer | Joedy Lenz | Former CTO of CARFAX |
| Chief People Officer | Larissa Cerqueira | Former CHRO at Fluence Energy |
Business Analysis & Competitive Dynamics
Mobility Global is the automotive data and technology division of S&P Global, anchored by its crown jewel brand CARFAX — the dominant player in used-vehicle history reports with a near-monopoly position built on decades of proprietary vehicle data that is virtually impossible to replicate. The business also includes automotiveMastermind (dealer marketing), Polk Automotive Solutions (registration and loyalty analytics), and Market Scan (real-time payment and incentive data).
The company operates in a $30B+ total addressable market across used vehicle data, new vehicle sales tools, and strategic planning analytics. Core competitive advantages include the CARFAX data moat (the largest vehicle history database in North America), deeply embedded dealer workflows, and high switching costs — dealers and consumers rely on CARFAX as the standard for vehicle transparency.
Financial profile is exceptional: 60% EBITDA margins rank among the highest in the data/analytics sector, with 8% revenue growth in a mature automotive market. The EV transition creates new growth vectors — battery health data, charging history, and EV-specific valuation models — that extend the CARFAX franchise into new revenue streams. International expansion (CARFAX is primarily US/Canada today) represents another untapped growth lever.
Key risks include cyclical automotive market exposure, the potential for large dealer groups and OEMs to build competing data platforms, and smaller standalone scale ($1.6B revenue) which may limit bargaining power with large customers. However, the data moat and brand strength substantially mitigate these risks.
Correction (July 31, 2026): the “60% EBITDA margins” and “$1.6B revenue” in the two paragraphs above are wrong — actual FY2025 figures are $1,750M of revenue at a 40.6% adjusted EBITDA margin. See the correction notice at the top of this page. The qualitative business analysis — the CARFAX moat, the $30B+ TAM, the EV and international growth vectors — is unaffected; 8% revenue growth was accurate (8.5% in FY2025).
Acquisition Analysis
Mobility Global is widely viewed as a highly attractive acquisition target, with a high probability of takeout within 12-24 months post-spinoff. Standalone valuation is estimated at 15-20x EBITDA ($14-19B), with a 30-50% acquisition premium implying a $18-28B+ takeout price.
Correction (July 31, 2026): the dollar valuations in the paragraph above were derived from the erroneous ≈60% margin and are void. On the actual $711M of FY2025 adjusted EBITDA, 15-20x implies $10.7-14.2B of enterprise value, not $14-19B — and the market has priced it far lower still, at ≈$7.81B (11.0x) as of the July 31 close. A 30-50% premium to the current EV implies a $10.2-11.7B takeout, not $18-28B+. The qualitative acquisition appeal is unchanged.
Correction (May 31, 2026): Prior reports cited Cox Automotive as the most likely acquirer. That specific speculation is unsubstantiated — it appears to stem from name confusion with Cox’s own internal “Mobility” division. The underlying acquisition appeal of the CARFAX data asset is unchanged; the most credible buyers are now PE data specialists and large dealer groups.
Potential Acquirers:
| Acquirer | Strategic Logic |
|---|---|
| Private Equity (Vista, Thoma Bravo, Silver Lake) | High-margin, recurring-revenue data businesses are core PE playbook. ~60% EBITDA margins are exceptional. Most credible acquirer path. |
| Auto dealer groups (AutoNation, Lithia, CarMax) | Want to own CARFAX data rather than paying for it. Vertical integration play. |
| Data / AI platforms | Automotive data for AI training, autonomous vehicle services, and connected car platforms. |
Changes & Developments
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| Jul 31, 2026 | ⬇️ Downgraded A+ (4.60) → A (4.35) on a data correction, not a business deterioration. The ≈60% EBITDA margin carried since October 2025 is wrong: FY2025 revenue $1,750M, adjusted EBITDA $711M (40.6% margin), FCF $461M, GAAP net income $220M. Spun July 1 as planned — 1:1, 100% distributed, 294,821,318 shares, NYSE. Day-1 close $21.19; post-spin low $19.26 on day 5; $20.38 at the July 31 close (-3.8% vs Day 1, +5.8% off the low). Parent SPGI -0.7%. At $20.38: ≈$7.81B EV, 11.0x EV/adj. EBITDA, 13.0x P/FCF, 7.7% FCF yield, 2.81x gross leverage (above its own <2.5x target). Rating stays BUY. Next catalyst: first standalone results August 7. |
| Jun 30, 2026 | Grade unchanged (A+, 4.60), retained as TOP PICK. Distribution confirmed on track for July 1; record date June 15 passed; when-issued (MBGL WI) traded June 26-30. Nothing in June contradicted the thesis as then understood — the margin error had not yet been caught. Fully de-risked on timing. |
| May 31, 2026 | Grade unchanged (A+, 4.60). Form 10 publicly filed May 7. Investor Day held May 12 in NYC — medium-term framework: 7.5-10% organic revenue growth, 8-11% adj. EBITDA growth, +50bps/yr margin, 75%+ FCF return, dividend 20-25% of GAAP net income. Ticker MBGL (NYSE); record date June 15; distribution July 1 (1:1, S&P retains 0%); when-issued June 26-30. ~$2B senior notes fund a one-time ~$1.95B payment to S&P; capital structure <2.5x gross leverage, ~$150M cash, $500M revolver. Cox Automotive acquirer speculation retracted as unsubstantiated (name confusion). |
| Apr 15, 2026 | Grade unchanged (A+). Investor Day confirmed May 12, 2026 in NYC. Renato Negro named CAO effective April 6. Matt Calderone named CFO-designate. Investment Scorecard: 4.65/5.0. |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Rebranded from “S&P Mobility” to “Mobility Global, Inc.” (Feb 3). SPGI stock dropped 10% on rebrand news. Confidential Form 10 filed with SEC. Targeting investment-grade credit rating. |
| Jan 29, 2026 | Full C-suite announced: CEO Bill Eager, President CARFAX Scott Fredericks, President Business Solutions Joe Lafeir, CLO Tasha Matharu, CIO Joedy Lenz, CPO Larissa Cerqueira. Timeline tightened to Q2 2026. |
| Oct 24, 2025 | Promoted to #1 ranking and A+ (TOP PICK). Timeline narrowed to Q2-Q3 2026. Acquisition likelihood rated “Very High (90%+).” Valuation range: $14-28B+. |
| Oct 23, 2025 | First appearance. No formal grade (described as “highly attractive”). Listed as #7. Revenue $1.6B, 60% EBITDA margins. S&P Global Investor Day Nov 13 noted as key upcoming event. |
In Depth Analysis
April 28, 2026 deep-dive, with key facts refreshed for the May 31, 2026 report (debt structure, catalysts, and the Cox acquirer retraction).
Competitive Dynamics
1. Product segments and competitors
✅ Mobility Global operates across four product lines, each with a distinct competitive landscape:
| Segment | What it does | Revenue contribution | Key competitors |
|---|---|---|---|
| CARFAX (Used Vehicle) | Vehicle history reports, dealer inventory tools | Largest segment (~50%+) | AutoCheck (Experian), dealer proprietary data |
| automotiveMastermind | Dealer marketing, customer targeting, conquest campaigns | Significant | DealerSocket (Solera), DealerInspire (Cars.com), Urban Science |
| Polk Automotive Solutions | Registration data, loyalty analytics, market forecasting | Moderate | IHS Markit (now internal to S&P — will transfer or license post-spin), J.D. Power, Wards Intelligence |
| Market Scan | Real-time payment quoting, incentive data, F&I tools | Moderate | RouteOne, DealerTrack (Cox Auto), MaximTrak |
2. Market concentration
✅ Concentrated (near-monopoly) in core CARFAX business. CARFAX dominates consumer-facing vehicle history reports with estimated 80-90%+ market share in the US. Experian’s AutoCheck is the only meaningful competitor but has never achieved comparable consumer brand recognition or dealer adoption.
⚠️ Oligopolistic in the broader automotive data market. Dealer marketing, analytics, and F&I tools are contested by a handful of major players (Cox Automotive, Solera, Cars.com, J.D. Power) but no single dominant winner. Mobility Global’s advantage is having multiple products that cross-sell within the same dealership.
⚠️ Fragmented in emerging areas. EV data (battery health, charging history), connected car analytics, and AI-powered valuation tools are nascent markets with no established leader yet — representing both opportunity and competitive uncertainty.
3. Moats and weak spots
✅ Strongest moat: CARFAX data moat. Decades of accumulated vehicle history records (accidents, service, ownership, recalls) from insurance companies, DMVs, service shops, and auctions. This dataset is effectively impossible to replicate from scratch — a new entrant would need 20+ years of data collection agreements.
✅ Strong moat: Dealer workflow embedding. CARFAX is deeply integrated into dealer management systems (DMS). Dealers use CARFAX reports as part of their standard vehicle appraisal and sales process. Switching costs are high because changing tools disrupts daily operations.
⚠️ Moderate moat: Polk data assets. Registration and loyalty data is valuable but faces competition from IHS Markit (which was part of S&P Global pre-merger — unclear how this data relationship works post-spin) and J.D. Power.
⚠️ Weak spot: Limited international presence. CARFAX operates primarily in the US and Canada. European and Asian vehicle history markets are served by different providers (e.g., HPI in the UK, Carvertical in Europe). International expansion is an opportunity but requires building new data relationships from scratch in each market.
❓ Weak spot: OEM direct data risk. As automakers build connected car platforms (GM OnStar, Ford SYNC, Tesla), they collect real-time vehicle data directly. Over time, OEMs could potentially bypass CARFAX by offering their own history/condition reports. However, CARFAX aggregates data across all brands — a single-OEM report can’t match cross-brand coverage.
4. Head-to-head vs closest competitor: Cox Automotive
⚠️ Cox Automotive is the most comparable company — a private automotive data/marketplace conglomerate owned by Cox Enterprises.
| Dimension | Mobility Global | Cox Automotive |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B | ~$8-10B (estimated, private) |
| Key brands | CARFAX, Polk, automotiveMastermind, Market Scan | Autotrader, Kelley Blue Book, Manheim, Dealertrack, VinSolutions |
| Core strength | Vehicle history data (CARFAX monopoly) | Marketplace/listings (Autotrader) + wholesale auctions (Manheim) |
| Dealer penetration | High (CARFAX used by ~90%+ of franchise dealers) | Very high (Autotrader + Manheim are industry standards) |
| Margin profile | ~60% EBITDA | ⚠️ Unknown (private), estimated 20-30% |
| Consumer brand | CARFAX is iconic, consumer-facing | Autotrader + KBB are consumer-facing |
| Data moat | Vehicle history = deepest moat | Pricing data (KBB) + auction data (Manheim) |
Key insight: These two companies are complementary, not directly competitive in most segments. CARFAX does vehicle history; Cox does marketplace/pricing/auctions. (Note: prior reports speculated that this complementarity made Cox a likely acquirer of Mobility Global; the May 31, 2026 report retracted that as unsubstantiated name-confusion. The competitive complementarity stands; the acquisition thesis does not.)
5. Crown jewel: CARFAX
✅ CARFAX is the crown jewel and the primary reason for the A+ rating.
- Data moat: Proprietary database of vehicle history records built over 40+ years (founded 1984)
- Source network: Data from 130,000+ sources including insurance companies, DMVs, service departments, auctions, fire departments, and fleet operators
- Consumer recognition: CARFAX is effectively a verb — “has it been CARFAX’d?” Brand awareness estimated at 90%+ among US car buyers
- Dealer standard: Used by virtually every franchise dealer in North America as part of standard vehicle appraisal and sales process
- Recurring revenue: Dealers pay subscription fees for unlimited reports; consumers pay per report or subscribe
- ⚠️ Network effects: More data sources → more accurate reports → more consumer trust → more dealer adoption → more data sources. This flywheel has been compounding for decades.
6. Total addressable market
✅ S&P Global has cited a $30B+ TAM for the automotive data market. This includes:
- Used vehicle data and transparency tools
- New vehicle sales tools and dealer marketing
- Automotive analytics, forecasting, and consulting
- F&I (finance and insurance) technology
- ⚠️ Emerging: EV battery data, connected car analytics, autonomous vehicle data services
⚠️ TAM growth rate estimated at 5-8% annually, driven by:
- Increasing used vehicle transaction volumes
- Digital transformation of dealership operations
- EV transition creating new data needs
- Growing consumer demand for vehicle transparency
7. Geographic competitive map
✅ North America: CARFAX is dominant. The US and Canada represent the vast majority of current revenue.
⚠️ Europe: Fragmented market. HPI (UK), Carvertical (pan-European), ADAC (Germany), and various national services compete. No single dominant player. CARFAX has limited presence.
⚠️ Asia-Pacific: Even more fragmented. Market for vehicle history data is less mature. OEMs and government registries play a larger role.
❓ International expansion potential: Significant long-term opportunity, but requires building data source networks country-by-country. Could accelerate via acquisition of local players.
Financials & Valuation
1. Operating margins vs peers
⚠️ Direct public peers are scarce — most automotive data companies are private divisions or were acquired. Closest comparisons are to other high-margin data/analytics businesses:
| Company | EBITDA Margin | Business type | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobility Global | ~60% | Automotive data monopoly | — |
| Verisk Analytics (VRSK) | ~55% | Insurance data/analytics | ✅ Similar data moat model, similar margins |
| CoStar Group (CSGP) | ~35% | Real estate data/marketplace | ✅ Similar “data + marketplace” structure |
| TransUnion (TRU) | ~35% | Consumer credit data | ⚠️ Data business, but lower margins |
| Cox Automotive (private) | ~20-30% est. | Auto marketplace/auctions | ⚠️ Most direct comp but private; lower margins due to physical auction operations |
| J.D. Power (private) | Unknown | Auto research/consulting | ⚠️ Competitor in analytics but much smaller |
Key insight: Mobility Global’s 60% EBITDA margin is exceptional even among premium data businesses. Verisk is the closest margin comp and trades at 25-30x EBITDA. The margin premium reflects CARFAX’s near-monopoly pricing power and asset-light model.
Correction (July 31, 2026): this comparison inverts on the corrected figure. At 40.6%, Mobility Global does not out-margin Verisk (~55%) — it sits below it, between Verisk and the ~35% cohort (CoStar, TransUnion). It is a strong margin, not an exceptional one, and it does not by itself justify a Verisk-like multiple. The “margin premium” premise of the peer tables in this section and the one below does not hold.
2. Peer financial comparison
⚠️ Limited by lack of direct public peers. Best available comparison using Verisk (VRSK) and CoStar (CSGP) as proxies for high-quality data businesses:
| Metric | Mobility Global | Verisk (VRSK) | CoStar (CSGP) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B | ~$2.8B | ~$2.7B |
| EBITDA Margin | ~60% | ~55% | ~35% |
| Revenue Growth | 8% | ~7% | ~12% |
| Debt/EBITDA | ~2x (at spin) | ~2.5x | ~0.5x |
| ROIC | ❓ Unknown | ~20%+ | ~8% |
| EV/EBITDA | ❓ TBD (not yet trading) | ~25-30x | ~35-40x |
✅ Balance sheet: Now disclosed. Mobility Global’s Form 10 registration statement (the correct SEC form for a spinoff distribution, vs. an S-1 for a cash IPO) was filed publicly May 7, 2026. The company carries ~$2B senior notes (~2x EBITDA, <2.5x gross leverage target) with ~$150M cash and a $500M undrawn revolver — see the Debt structure section below.
❓ Capital efficiency (ROIC, asset turnover): Cannot assess until standalone financials are disclosed.
3. Implied standalone valuation
⚠️ Based on peer multiples and margin profile:
| Scenario | Multiple | EBITDA | Enterprise Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | 18x EBITDA | $960M | $17B | RTX/Safran-level multiple (lower due to smaller scale) |
| Base | 22x EBITDA | $960M | $21B | Moderate premium for margin quality |
| Bull | 28x EBITDA | $960M | $27B | Verisk-like multiple for monopoly data assets |
| With acquisition premium | +30-50% | — | $22-40B | If takeout materializes within 12-24 months |
Correction (July 31, 2026) — this ladder is void. Every row rests on a $960M EBITDA estimate that came from applying the erroneous ≈60% margin to ≈$1.6B of revenue. Actual FY2025 adjusted EBITDA is $711M, 26% lower. The table is left standing as what was published; the restated valuation is:
Metric At the July 31, 2026 close ($20.38) Market capitalization $6.01B (294.8M shares) Net debt ≈$1.8B (≈$2B notes less ≈$200M cash) Enterprise value ≈$7.81B EV / Adj. EBITDA 11.0x EV / GAAP EBITDA 12.0x P / FCF 13.0x FCF yield 7.7% The market is valuing Mobility Global at 11.0x, less than the 18x “conservative” floor this ladder assumed — and against an EBITDA base a quarter smaller. The bull-case $27B EV is roughly 3.5x the company’s actual enterprise value. A separate caution on share count: an S-8 registers 46,000,000 shares (15.6% of shares issued) for employee incentive plans; if the full reserve were eventually issued, P/FCF would rise from 13.0x to 15.1x.
4. Debt structure
✅ Confirmed (Form 10 public May 7 + May 12 Investor Day). Mobility Global launched ~$2B senior unsecured notes, funding a one-time cash payment of up to ~$1.95B to S&P Global at separation. Target capital structure: under 2.5x gross leverage, ~$150M cash on hand, and a $500M undrawn revolver. Investment-grade credit rating targeted (confirmed).
⚠️ At ~$2B debt on ~$960M EBITDA, leverage of ~2x is moderate and sits within the stated <2.5x ceiling — leaving ample room for the 75%+ FCF return framework and bolt-on M&A. This is notably lighter than the ~3.0x Honeywell loaded onto Honeywell Aerospace.
Correction (July 31, 2026): on the actual $711M of adjusted EBITDA, $2B of notes is 2.81x gross leverage (2.53x net) — above the company’s own <2.5x target, not comfortably inside it. Mobility Global started life offside its stated ceiling. This is materially different from the “~2x, ample room” characterisation above, and it is one of the two reasons the Financial Profile score fell from 5 to 4. It does self-cure without any repayment: at the guided 8-11% adjusted EBITDA growth, gross leverage reaches 2.57x in 2026 and 2.35x in 2027. Having committed 75%+ of FCF to shareholders, management has structurally allocated cash away from deleveraging — expect the company to grow into the target rather than pay down principal.
5. Post-interest free cash flow
❓ Cannot calculate until debt structure is known. Framework for when Form 10 is public:
- EBITDA: ~$960M
- Less: estimated capex (~$50-100M for asset-light data business)
- Less: interest expense (depends on debt load)
- Less: taxes
- = Free cash flow to equity
⚠️ If debt is ~$2.5B at ~5% coupon: interest ~$125M, pre-tax FCF ~$735-810M. At a $21B equity value, FCF yield ~3.5-4.0%.
6. Valuation framework
⚠️ Given the unknowns, a simplified framework:
- Attractive: Below 18x EBITDA (~$17B EV). Unlikely unless market sells off post-spin (forced selling by index funds).
- Fair: 20-24x EBITDA ($19-23B EV). Reflects high margins but small scale and auto cyclicality.
- Expensive: Above 28x EBITDA ($27B+ EV). Only justified if acquisition is imminent.
7. Dividend strategy
❓ Unknown. No guidance on dividend policy. Possible scenarios:
- ⚠️ Likely: Modest initial dividend (1-2% yield) to attract income-oriented investors, with priority on debt paydown
- ⚠️ Possible: No dividend initially, prioritizing debt reduction and M&A optionality
- ❓ Unlikely: High dividend payout — would limit strategic flexibility and signal limited growth ambitions
Correction (July 31, 2026) — the ❓ items in §5, §6 and §7 above are now answered, and two of the answers differ from the guesses.
- §5 Post-interest FCF: no longer an estimate. FY2025 free cash flow was $461M (26.3% margin, 65% conversion) on capex of just $24M — 1.4% of revenue, well below the “$50-100M” assumed. The projected “$735-810M pre-tax FCF” was a function of the wrong EBITDA. At the actual $461M and a $6.01B market cap, the FCF yield is 7.7% — roughly double the “3.5-4.0%” the framework anticipated, because the equity is worth a third of what was assumed.
- §6 Valuation framework: the “attractive below 18x EBITDA” threshold is superseded. The stock trades at 11.0x.
- §7 Dividend: guidance is now explicit — 20-25% of GAAP net income, buybacks from 2027, 75%+ of FCF returned annually. The “modest 1-2% yield” guess was too high: because GAAP net income is suppressed by $310M of non-cash amortization, a payout set against net income distributes only ~10% of the cash generated, giving a 0.6-0.9% yield. The real capital return is the buyback — total distributions run ≈$1.26-1.29/share, a 6.2-6.3% total shareholder yield, roughly six-sevenths of it repurchases. The “priority on debt paydown” premise was also wrong; see the debt correction above.
Spinoff Deep Dive
1. Prior spins from same parent
✅ This is S&P Global’s first major spinoff. S&P Global was itself formed from the McGraw-Hill spin in 2013 (when McGraw-Hill Education was separated from McGraw-Hill Financial, which became S&P Global). However, the Mobility separation is structurally different — it’s a carve-out of a business unit, not a split of the whole company.
⚠️ The closest precedent is the IHS Markit merger (2022), where S&P Global acquired IHS Markit for $44B and has been integrating/rationalizing overlapping businesses. Spinning off Mobility may partly be about simplifying the post-merger portfolio.
2. Parent motives and capital allocation
✅ Primary motive: Sharpen S&P Global’s identity as a pure-play financial markets data company (ratings, indices, commodities, market intelligence). Mobility’s automotive focus is strategically distinct and dilutes the financial-data narrative.
⚠️ Secondary motive: Unlock conglomerate discount. S&P Global trades at ~25-28x EBITDA; if Mobility trades at a similar or higher multiple separately, total shareholder value increases.
⚠️ Capital allocation signal: The fact that S&P is spinning off (not selling) suggests they believe Mobility is worth more as a public standalone than in a private sale. A sale would have been faster and simpler if the goal was just to exit.
3. RemainCo (S&P Global post-spin)
✅ S&P Global retains its core financial markets businesses:
- S&P Global Ratings: One of the “Big Three” credit rating agencies (with Moody’s and Fitch). Regulatory moat, high margins.
- S&P Dow Jones Indices: Passive investing drives AUM-linked revenue (S&P 500 index licensing). Very high margins.
- S&P Global Commodity Insights (Platts): Energy/commodity pricing benchmarks. Regulatory quasi-moat.
- S&P Global Market Intelligence: Financial data terminals, analytics. Competes with Bloomberg, Refinitiv.
⚠️ RemainCo is arguably a higher-quality business than SpinCo in terms of regulatory moats (ratings) and secular growth (indices/passive investing). However, Mobility Global has higher EBITDA margins and a stronger near-monopoly position in its niche.
4. Potential acquirers (detailed)
✅ See Executive Summary for acquirer table. Additional detail:
Correction (May 31, 2026): The Cox Automotive thesis is retracted — the May 31 report flagged it as unsubstantiated name-confusion with Cox’s own “Mobility” division. The probability previously assigned to Cox is redistributed to the PE path and “remains independent.” The PE consortium is now the most credible acquirer.
| Acquirer | Strategic Fit | Financial Ability | Regulatory Risk | Probability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PE consortium (Vista/Thoma Bravo/Silver Lake) | 8/10 | 9/10 | 9/10 | ⚠️ 45% |
| Big Tech (Microsoft/Google) | 6/10 | 10/10 | ⚠️ 5/10 (tech antitrust scrutiny) | ❓ 10% |
| Dealer groups | 7/10 | 5/10 (most are too small) | 8/10 | ❓ 10% |
| Remains independent | — | — | — | ⚠️ 35% |
5. Acquisition probability and premium
⚠️ Estimated ~70-80% probability of takeout within 24 months post-spinoff. The May 31 report softened the headline likelihood from “very high (90%+)” to “high,” reflecting the retraction of the Cox thesis (the 90%+ figure was partly Cox-driven).
⚠️ Expected premium: 30-50% over standalone trading price. CARFAX’s brand value and data moat justify a strategic premium. PE buyers would pay 20-30%; a strategic data/dealer buyer would pay 30-50%.
6. SpinCo as acquirer
⚠️ If Mobility Global remains independent, likely M&A targets include:
- International vehicle history companies (Carvertical, HPI) to expand CARFAX globally
- EV data startups (battery health analytics, charging network data)
- Dealer technology platforms to deepen dealer workflow integration
- ⚠️ Timeline: 12-24 months post-spin minimum (debt paydown first), then bolt-on acquisitions in the $100M-$1B range
7. Structural features
✅ Tax-free spinoff for US federal tax purposes ✅ Targeting investment-grade credit rating ❓ Exchange ratio: TBD ❓ Distribution ratio: TBD ❓ TSA (transition service agreements) with S&P Global: Likely for IT, HR, finance functions during transition. Duration and cost unknown. ❓ Insider lockup periods: Unknown
Investment Thesis
1. Bull case
CARFAX is a generational franchise — a consumer-facing data monopoly with 60% margins, 40 years of irreplaceable data, and deep dealer embedding. As a standalone, Mobility Global re-rates to premium data-company multiples (25-30x EBITDA) and attracts acquisition interest within 12-24 months at a 30-50% premium. EV transition and international expansion provide multi-year growth runway beyond current 8% rate. Total return potential: 50-100% within 2 years.
Correction (July 31, 2026): the bull case above is built on 60% margins and a re-rating to 25-30x EBITDA. At a 40.6% margin, a 25-30x multiple is not the natural landing zone — Verisk earns that multiple on a higher margin and this business does not clear that bar. The bull case survives, but for a different reason than the one stated here. The stock trades at 11.0x EV/EBITDA and 13.0x FCF with a 7.7% FCF yield and a 6.2%+ total shareholder yield; a total-distribution discount model implies $24-42 per share against a $20.38 price. The upside is a cheap multiple on a good business plus a 24%-of-shares-outstanding buyback over five years — not a premium re-rating. The bear case below is essentially intact, and its “S&P Global loads significant debt onto SpinCo” concern proved correct at 2.81x.
2. Bear case
Standalone at $1.6B revenue, Mobility Global is a small-cap data company in a cyclical end-market. If auto sales decline meaningfully, dealer subscriptions churn and consumer report purchases fall. OEMs increasingly collect vehicle data directly via connected car platforms, slowly eroding CARFAX’s information advantage over a 5-10 year horizon. S&P Global loads significant debt onto SpinCo, limiting capital flexibility and suppressing equity returns. No acquisition materializes due to antitrust concerns or valuation disagreements with PE buyers. Total return: flat to -20% over 2 years.
3. Top 3 catalysts (next 12 months)
- ✅ May 7, 2026 — Public Form 10 (filed): Standalone financial statements, debt structure (~$2B notes, <2.5x leverage), and risk factors now public — resolved most ❓ items in this analysis.
- ✅ May 12, 2026 — Investor Day (delivered): Standalone framework laid out — 7.5-10% organic growth, 8-11% adj. EBITDA growth, +50bps/yr margin, 75%+ FCF return, dividend at 20-25% of GAAP net income.
- ⚠️ June 15 record date / July 1 distribution: Forced selling by index funds and investors avoiding automotive exposure could create a buying opportunity in the first 30-60 days of MBGL trading; index inclusion follows.
4. Top 3 risks
- ⚠️ Debt load at spin: If S&P Global assigns heavy debt ($3B+), equity value compression and limited strategic flexibility follow.
- ⚠️ Auto market cyclicality: A recession or meaningful decline in used vehicle transactions would directly impact CARFAX subscription revenue and report volumes.
- ❓ OEM disintermediation over time: Long-term risk that connected car data from OEMs erodes the value of third-party vehicle history reports. Not an imminent threat but a structural question for the 5-10 year thesis.
5. Capital return framework
❓ No guidance available. Expected sequence based on typical spinoff patterns and reported intent:
- Debt management (months 0-12): Prioritize maintaining investment-grade rating. Unlikely to aggressively pay down debt immediately, but will manage within rating agency expectations.
- Dividend initiation (months 0-6): ⚠️ Likely a modest initial dividend (1-2% yield) to broaden investor appeal.
- Buybacks (months 12-24): ⚠️ If trading at a discount to intrinsic value, management may authorize a buyback program.
- M&A (months 18-36): Bolt-on acquisitions once leverage normalizes and standalone operations are stabilized.
Report-by-Report Analysis
Analysis — July 31, 2026
First report after the July 1 separation. The margin correction lands here, and with it the regrade. Prices as of the July 31, 2026 close.
Trading since the spin
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Day-1 close (Jul 1) | $21.19 |
| Post-spin low | $19.26 on Jul 6 (day 5) |
| Jul 31 close | $20.38 |
| Return vs Day 1 | -3.8% |
| Return vs low | +5.8% |
| Parent SPGI | -0.7% since the spin |
The anticipated forced-selling window did materialise, but it was shallow and brief — a 9% drawdown over five sessions, then a grind back. The clean, zero-retained-stake structure meant no overhang on either side.
The correction
FY2025 revenue $1,750M, adjusted EBITDA $711M (40.6% margin), free cash flow $461M (26.3% margin, 65% conversion), GAAP net income $220M. The ≈60% margin this profile had carried since October 2025 is not supported by the Investor Day financials; the ≈$1.6B revenue figure was FY2024’s $1,613M. Revenue growth was 8.6% in 2024 and 8.5% in 2025 — the one figure the earlier analysis had right. The full restatement, including the net-income bridge, is in the correction notice at the top of this page.
Valuation on the corrected figures
Market cap $6.01B on 294,821,318 shares; net debt ≈$1.8B; enterprise value ≈$7.81B. That is 11.0x EV/adjusted EBITDA, 12.0x EV/GAAP EBITDA, 13.0x P/FCF and a 7.7% FCF yield. Pro-forma standalone earnings are lower than the $220M carve-out figure suggests: that number carried only $13M of net interest, whereas ≈$2B of notes at an investment-grade 5.0-6.0% coupon implies $100-120M annually. On FY2025 EBIT of $339M at the guided 25-27% tax rate, pro-forma net income is roughly $162-177M ($0.55-0.60 EPS) — before $75-100M of one-time stand-up costs over 12-18 months.
Capital returns
Management’s framework is 20-25% of GAAP net income as dividends, buybacks beginning in 2027, and 75%+ of free cash flow returned annually. The dividend will be small — a 0.6-0.9% yield — because a payout set against net income distributes only about a tenth of the cash this business generates while $310M of amortization suppresses reported earnings. Total distributions run ≈$1.26-1.29 per share, a 6.2-6.3% total shareholder yield, roughly six-sevenths of it repurchases. A dividend discount model values only the dividend and returns $2.44-5.50 per share — 12-27% of the price — which is a verdict on the instrument, not the security. Discounting total distributions implies $24-42 per share, with the current quote below every cell in that grid.
Sustained repurchases at 13.0x FCF earn 7.7% against ≈4.1% after-tax for retiring debt, and would retire roughly 24% of the share count over five years (295M → ≈223M). Heavier deleveraging produces lower per-share value while the stock trades below intrinsic value.
Grade change: A+ (4.60) → A (4.35)
| Dimension | Weight | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financial Profile | 25% | 4 ⬇️ | 40.6% adj. EBITDA and 26.3% FCF margins are strong, but growth is guided 7.5-10% (not double-digit) and the ≈$2B of notes funding a ≈$1.9B payment to the parent left MBGL at 2.81x gross leverage on day one, above its own <2.5x target (was 5, on an erroneous ≈60% margin) |
| Competitive Position | 25% | 5 | CARFAX near-monopoly; 53M+ car-care users, 40K+ dealer customers, 100% of top-40 OEMs |
| Strategic Rationale | 20% | 4 | Clear focus-unlock for both entities; clean 100% distribution |
| Management & Governance | 20% | 4 | Full C-suite named; Investor Day delivered with detailed multi-year targets |
| Acquisition Potential | 10% | 5 | High-value data asset; credible PE and strategic acquirers |
| Weighted Score | 4.35 | ||
| Investment Grade | A | Strong Buy |
Grade Change: A+ (4.60) → A (4.35). The trigger is the data correction. At 40.6% the business still clears the methodology’s “30%+ margins” test for a 5, but it fails the “double-digit growth” test and starts levered near its own target — squarely the 4 band. Nothing about the competitive position, management or acquisition appeal changed.
Recommendation: ⭐⭐⭐⭐ BUY. The regrade lowers the label, not the conclusion. It is a reasonably priced compounder rather than the extraordinary mispricing the A+ implied.
Next catalyst
⚠️ First standalone quarterly results, August 7, 2026 (before market open; 8:00am ET call with CEO Bill Eager and CFO Matt Calderone). First hard data on standalone margins, actual interest expense on the new notes, stand-up cost run-rate, and any initial dividend declaration.
Analysis — June 30, 2026
Brief section — the final pre-distribution update. No new financial disclosure; the transaction was de-risked on timing and awaiting the July 1 distribution.
- Grade: A+ (4.60), unchanged. Retained as the report’s #1 ranked name and TOP PICK.
- Timing: record date June 15 passed; when-issued trading (MBGL WI / SPGI WI) ran June 26-30; distribution and first regular-way trading confirmed for July 1, with S&P 500 index treatment to follow. 1 MBGL per 1 SPGI, S&P Global retaining 0%.
- Thesis as stated at the time: “Exceptional ≈60% EBITDA margins, iconic CARFAX brand with near-monopoly in used-car data.” That margin figure was wrong — see the July 31 correction above. It was not caught until the post-spin review.
- Nothing in June contradicted the thesis as it was then understood. No new financials were filed between the May 12 Investor Day and the distribution.
Analysis — May 31, 2026
Full section — Form 10 made public, Investor Day delivered, and final terms (ticker, record/distribution dates) set. The transaction is now fully de-risked on timing.
- Company: S&P Global Inc. (SPGI) — Current Price: ~$424.00 (May 29, 2026)
- SpinCo: Mobility Global, Inc. (ticker MBGL, NYSE)
- Industry: Automotive Data & Technology
- Expected Completion: July 1, 2026
- Structure: Classic Spinoff
- Investment Grade: A+ (Top Pick) — score 4.60
Financial Structure
| Metric | Mobility Global (SpinCo) |
|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B |
| EBITDA Margin | ~60% |
| Revenue growth target | 7.5-10% organic |
| Adj. EBITDA growth target | 8-11% |
| Capital structure | ~$2B senior notes, <2.5x gross leverage, ~$150M cash, $500M revolver |
Key Developments Since Last Report
- May 7, 2026: Form 10 publicly filed (previously confidential)
- May 12, 2026: Investor Day in NYC — CEO Bill Eager and CFO-designate Matt Calderone laid out a medium-term framework: 7.5-10% organic revenue growth, 8-11% adj. EBITDA growth, +50bps/yr margin expansion, 75%+ of FCF returned annually, dividend at 20-25% of GAAP net income
- Terms announced: Ticker MBGL (NYSE); record date June 15, 2026; distribution July 1, 2026 (12:01am ET); 1 MBGL per 1 SPGI; S&P retains 0%; when-issued window June 26-30
- ~$2B senior unsecured notes launched to fund a one-time cash payment (up to ~$1.95B) to S&P Global
Management Team
| Role | Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CEO | Bill Eager | President of S&P Global Mobility |
| CFO | Matt Calderone | CFO-designate |
| CAO | Renato Negro | Effective April 6, 2026 |
Transaction Timeline
- February 3, 2026: Rebranded as Mobility Global
- May 7, 2026: Form 10 publicly filed ✅
- May 12, 2026: Investor Day ✅
- June 15, 2026: Record date — deadline to own SPGI to qualify ⚠️
- June 26-30, 2026: When-issued trading
- July 1, 2026: Distribution & first regular-way MBGL trading 📅
Investment Scorecard
| Dimension | Weight | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financial Profile | 25% | 5 | ~60% EBITDA margins, 7.5-10% growth, high FCF |
| Competitive Position | 25% | 5 | CARFAX near-monopoly, data moat |
| Strategic Rationale | 20% | 4 | Clear focus-unlock for both entities |
| Management & Governance | 20% | 4 | Full C-suite named, Investor Day delivered |
| Acquisition Potential | 10% | 5 | High-value data asset; multiple credible PE/strategic acquirers |
| Weighted Score | 4.60 | ||
| Investment Grade | A+ | Top Pick |
Grade Change: Unchanged (A+). Form 10 publication, the delivered Investor Day, and a firm July 1 distribution date reinforce the thesis. Correction: prior “Cox Automotive most-likely-acquirer” framing retracted as unsubstantiated (name confusion with Cox’s own “Mobility” division); CARFAX’s underlying acquisition appeal is intact.
Acquisition Analysis
Potential Acquirers: PE data buyers (Vista, Thoma Bravo, Silver Lake); large auto dealer groups; data/AI platforms. Acquisition Likelihood: HIGH. Recommendation: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ STRONG BUY — position before the June 15 record date.
Analysis — April 15, 2026
- Company: S&P Global Inc. (SPGI) — Current Price: ~$432.94 (April 15, 2026)
- SpinCo: Mobility Global, Inc.
- Industry: Automotive Data & Technology
- Expected Completion: Mid-2026
- Structure: Classic Spinoff
- Investment Grade: A+ (TOP PICK)
- Key Thesis: Exceptional 60% EBITDA margins, iconic CARFAX brand with near-monopoly in used car data, high acquisition potential. Investor Day confirmed for May 12, 2026 in New York City.
Transaction Overview
- Original Company: S&P Global — financial information and analytics leader
- SpinCo: Mobility Global, Inc. — CARFAX, automotiveMastermind, Polk, Market Scan ($1.6B revenue, 8% growth)
- RemainCo: S&P Global — ratings, indices, Platts, Market Intelligence
- Rationale: Sharpen RemainCo’s financial-markets focus while giving Mobility standalone autonomy in $30B+ automotive data market
Financial Structure
| Metric | Mobility Global (SpinCo) | S&P Global RemainCo |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B (8% growth YoY) | Majority of S&P |
| EBITDA | ~$960M (trailing 12 months) | Majority |
| EBITDA Margin | 60% | High |
Key Developments Since Last Report
- April 6, 2026: Renato Negro named CAO (reporting to CFO-designate Matt Calderone)
- March 25, 2026: Investor Day formally set for May 12, 2026 in NYC (was referenced as Q2)
- Form 10 remains confidentially filed; public filing expected shortly ahead of May 12 Investor Day
- Public debt offering, equity roadshow still expected Q2 2026
Management Team
| Role | Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CEO | Bill Eager | President of S&P Global Mobility |
| CFO-designate | Matt Calderone | Named March 2026 |
| Chief Accounting Officer | Renato Negro | Effective April 6, 2026 |
| President, CARFAX | Scott Fredericks | Continuing |
| President, Business Solutions | Joe Lafeir | Continuing |
Transaction Timeline
- April 29, 2025: Spinoff announced
- November 13, 2025: S&P Global Investor Day
- February 3, 2026: Rebranded as Mobility Global
- April 6, 2026: CAO appointed
- May 12, 2026: Mobility Global Investor Day
- Mid-2026: Expected separation
- Record date: TBD (late Q2 2026)
Investment Analysis
SpinCo Strengths:
- 60% EBITDA margins — exceptional for data businesses
- CARFAX near-monopoly in used-vehicle history data
- Full C-suite in place — CEO, CFO, CAO, and business-unit presidents named
- 8% revenue growth in mature auto market
- EV transition opens new data opportunities (battery, charging)
- Targeting investment-grade credit rating
SpinCo Risks:
- Cyclical automotive market exposure
- Dealer/OEM building competing data platforms
- Smaller scale as standalone ($1.6B)
SpinCo Catalysts:
- May 12 Investor Day — major pricing-discovery event
- Form 10 public filing imminent
- Q2 public debt offering
- Acquisition potential remains very high
Investment Scorecard
| Dimension | Weight | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financial Profile | 25% | 5 | 60% EBITDA margins, 8% growth, high FCF |
| Competitive Position | 25% | 5 | CARFAX near-monopoly, data moat |
| Strategic Rationale | 20% | 4 | Clear focus-unlock for both entities |
| Management & Governance | 20% | 4 | Full C-suite named including CAO, equity comp expected |
| Acquisition Potential | 10% | 5 | Multiple high-probability acquirers (Cox, PE) |
| Weighted Score | 4.65 | ||
| Investment Grade | A+ | Top Pick |
Acquisition Analysis
Potential Acquirers:
- Cox Automotive: Autotrader, KBB, Manheim — obvious strategic combination with CARFAX
- Auto dealer groups (AutoNation, Lithia, CarMax): Want to own customer data
- Microsoft/Google: Automotive data for AI training
- Vista, Thoma Bravo, Silver Lake: High-margin data asset fit
Acquisition Likelihood: VERY HIGH (90%+)
Recommendation: STRONG BUY — Position before May 12 Investor Day and record date announcement.
Analysis — March 2, 2026
Full section — rebrand, Form 10 filing, and SPGI stock reaction are material new developments.
- Company: S&P Global Inc. (SPGI) — Current Price: ~$441.88
- SpinCo: Mobility Global, Inc. (formerly S&P Mobility)
- Investment Grade: A+ (TOP PICK)
Key Developments Since Last Report
- February 3, 2026: Rebranded as Mobility Global, Inc. — SPGI stock slid 10% on the news
- Form 10: Confidentially filed with SEC; public filing expected Q2 2026
- Q2 2026 Planned Events: Investor Day, equity roadshow, public debt offering (targeting investment-grade rating)
- Leadership: Bill Eager confirmed as designated CEO
Financial Structure
| Metric | Mobility Global (SpinCo) | S&P Global RemainCo |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B (8% growth YoY) | Majority of S&P |
| EBITDA | ~$960M (trailing 12 months) | Majority |
| EBITDA Margin | 60% | High |
Investment Analysis
SpinCo Strengths:
- Exceptional 60% EBITDA margins — among highest in data businesses
- CARFAX near-monopoly — iconic brand with decades of vehicle history data
- Data moat — proprietary vehicle history database impossible to replicate
- 8% revenue growth despite mature automotive market
- Full leadership team in place
- Targeting investment-grade credit rating (positive signal)
SpinCo Risks:
- Cyclical automotive market exposure
- Competition from dealers and OEMs building own data platforms
- Smaller scale as standalone ($1.6B revenue)
- SPGI dropped 10% on rebrand announcement — market concerned about losing the asset
SpinCo Catalysts:
- VERY HIGH acquisition potential — CARFAX is strategic asset
- EV transition driving new data/analytics demand
- International expansion (CARFAX primarily US/Canada)
- Q2 Investor Day will be a major catalyst for price discovery
Acquisition Analysis
Potential Acquirers:
- Cox Automotive: Owns Autotrader, Kelley Blue Book, Manheim — consolidate with CARFAX
- Auto dealer groups (AutoNation, Lithia, CarMax): Want to own CARFAX data
- Microsoft/Google: Automotive data for AI training
- Private Equity (Vista, Thoma Bravo, Silver Lake): Love high-margin data businesses
Acquisition Likelihood: VERY HIGH (90%+)
Recommendation: STRONG BUY — Monitor for Q2 2026 Investor Day and public Form 10 filing. Position before record date announcement.
Analysis — January 29, 2026
Full section — full management team announced for the first time, a material milestone.
- Company: S&P Global Inc. (SPGI)
- SpinCo: S&P Mobility
- Expected Completion: Q2 2026
- Investment Grade: A+ (TOP PICK)
Management Team (NEW — Fully Announced)
| Role | Name | Background |
|---|---|---|
| CEO (Designated) | Bill Eager | President of S&P Global Mobility |
| President, CARFAX | Scott Fredericks | Promoted from COO |
| President, Mobility Business Solutions | Joe Lafeir | Former President of Automotive Insights |
| Chief Legal Officer | Tasha Matharu | Deputy General Counsel of S&P Global |
| Chief Information Officer | Joedy Lenz | Former CTO of CARFAX |
| Chief People Officer | Larissa Cerqueira | Former CHRO at Fluence Energy |
POSITIVE SIGNAL: Full C-suite now in place, experienced leadership team assembled.
Financial Structure
| Metric | S&P Mobility (SpinCo) | S&P Global RemainCo |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B (8% growth YoY) | Majority of S&P |
| EBITDA | ~$960M (trailing 12 months) | Majority |
| EBITDA Margin | 60% (exceptional) | High |
Investment Analysis
SpinCo Strengths:
- Exceptional 60% EBITDA margins — among highest in data businesses
- CARFAX near-monopoly — iconic brand with decades of vehicle history data
- Data moat — proprietary vehicle history database impossible to replicate
- 8% revenue growth despite mature automotive market
- Full leadership team now in place
SpinCo Risks:
- Cyclical automotive market exposure
- Competition from dealers and OEMs building own data platforms
- Smaller scale as standalone ($1.6B revenue)
SpinCo Catalysts:
- VERY HIGH acquisition potential — CARFAX is strategic asset
- EV transition driving new data/analytics demand
- International expansion (CARFAX primarily US/Canada)
Acquisition Analysis
Potential Acquirers:
- Cox Automotive: Owns Autotrader, Kelley Blue Book, Manheim — consolidate with CARFAX
- Auto dealer groups (AutoNation, Lithia, CarMax): Want to own CARFAX data
- Microsoft/Google: Automotive data for AI training
- Private Equity (Vista, Thoma Bravo, Silver Lake): Love high-margin data businesses
Acquisition Likelihood: VERY HIGH (90%+)
Recommendation: STRONG BUY — Position for Q1-Q2 2026 record date.
Analysis — October 24, 2025
Summary — initial formal grading and detailed analysis. Core thesis established here; financials unchanged in later reports.
- Investment Grade: A+ (TOP PICK) — first formal grade assigned
- Promoted from #7 to #1 ranking across all tracked spinoffs
- Timeline: Q2-Q3 2026 (narrowed from “Late 2026”)
- Standalone valuation: 15-20x EBITDA = $14-19B market cap
- With acquisition premium (30-50%): $18-28B+ takeout value
- Cox Automotive identified as #1 potential acquirer (Autotrader + KBB + Manheim + CARFAX = automotive data monopoly)
- Silver Lake added to PE acquirer list
- Management team not yet announced (key pending catalyst)
- Full analysis established core thesis: CARFAX near-monopoly, 60% margins, data moat, very high acquisition probability
Analysis — October 23, 2025
Summary — first mention. Brief overview only, pre-grading system.
- Listed as spinoff #7 (not yet prioritized as top pick)
- No formal letter grade — described as “highly attractive” and “could be one of the best spinoff opportunities in 2026”
- Revenue $1.6B, 8% growth, ~$960M EBITDA, ~60% EBITDA margin
- Expected Late 2026 (12-18 months from April 2025 announcement)
- Management team not yet announced
- Acquisition likelihood rated “High” with 30-50% premium potential
- Six potential acquirer categories identified (Cox, dealer groups, big tech, OEMs, financial data cos, PE)
- S&P Global Investor Day November 13, 2025 flagged as key upcoming event